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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROY ERWIN PRICE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJOHN W. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12882

Def end ant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Roy Erwin Price, appeals from a
decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying
his release from the Utah State Prison upon a writ of
habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Roy Erwin Price filed a Complaint and Petition
Seeking a 'Vrit of Habeas Corpus alleging that his
corrunitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The
matter came on for hearing on l\:1arch 28, 1972, before
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, who denied the petition on
March 29, 1971.
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RELIEF SOUGHT OX APPEAL
Appellant, Hoy Erwin Price, seeks the reversal of
the court below with the direction that he he released
from the custody of the Hcspondent.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Hoy Erwin Price entered a plea of guilty on October 29, 1969, to the charge of issuing a check against
insufficient furn ls before Judge Nelson of the Fourth
Judicial District. (Exhibit I) He was sentenced on
that date to he committe<I to the lTtah State Prison for
the irnleterminate term as provided hr law. (Exhibit 1,
p. 3-4) On October 22, 1969, U1e in formation eharging
l\Ir. Price was read and l\Ir. Price acknowledged that
he knew what the arraignment was and that he wa11ted
additional time before entering his plea. (Exhibit 2}
The transcript of the entry of the plea (Exhibit I)
indicates that l\Ir. Price was not informed of the consequences of his plea. The transc1·ipts indicate that the
court asked Mr. Price what his plea was and l\Ir. Prire
pleaded guilty. (Exhibit I, p. 2) The court asked if
l\Ir. Price had been to the prison before and asked if he
wanted to be heard, to whieh .Mr. Price's counsel answered that he had nothing to say. (Exhibit l, p. 3) Mr.
Price was then sentenced to be committed to the Utah
State Prison. (Exhibit I, p. 3, 4)
At the habeas corpus hearing, l\Ir. Price testified
that he had pleaded guilty to issuing a check against
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insufficient funds in l!HlH and also in 1!)60. (R. 44, 45)
For the conviction in l!Hl!J, l\lr. Price sen-cd fj,·e years
in the Utah State Prison, having been parolled and then
,·iolatcd for leaving the state. ( R. 44, 45) For the 1960
conviction l\Ir. Price served time in the eounty jail. (R.
48) On neither of these two occasions did l\1 r. Price
ha1·e the assistance of counsel. (R. 46, 47)
l\I r. Price further testified that he had talked with
fellow inmates about the judicial system somewhat (R.
50, 51) and that he was a high school graduate with
one year of college. ( R. 48) l\I r. Price also testified
that he knew that a jury was a group of people who
"judge you" (R. 50) and that a trial was what he was
ha,·ing-referring to the habeas corpus hearing. (R. 50)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT JlELOW ERHED IN DENYING

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS COHPUS BECAUSE THE RECORD
DOES NOT SHOW THAT APPELLANT'S
PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED.

Appellant contends that his plea of guilty was not
knowingly and intelligently entered, hecause the record
shows no intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights,
nor does it show that he was adequately informed
of such rights.
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In Boykin v. Alabama, :1!>5 U.S. 238, 8!) S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (196!>), the United States Supreme
Court made it perfectly clear what is required by a state
court when one pleads guilty. The Court held that it
was error on the part of the trial judge to accept a plea
of guilty without a showing on the record that the plea
was intelligently mid voluntarily made. The Court held
the record must show a waiver of rights and indicate if
the guilty plea is knowingly made.
The Court held, 23 L.Ed.2d at 279, that,
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea
of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.
First, is the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth [citation]. Second, is the right to trial
by jury. [citation] Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. [citation] We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal
rights from a silent record.
Boylt·in was decided June 2, 1969, before appellant entered his plea in the Fourth Judicial District Court.

The Court pointed out that it was error for the trial
judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative
showing that the plea was intelligent and voluntary. As
this was not done, the Court held the judgment must
be reversed.
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The petitioner in Boykin had counsel and the Court
pointed out that the record showed that the judge asked
no questions of the petitioner concerning his plea and
the petitioner did not address the court. The same facts
prernil in appellant's case.
The Court held, as have numerous other courts,
that a guilty plea must of course be intelligently and
voluntarily entered. Such is and has been the general
rule. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, S.Ct.
463, 25 L.E<l.2d 747, 756, fn. 5 and 6, and cases
therein cited. The standard enunciated by the Court was
simply that the voluntariness of the plea, if its exists,
be made apparent on the record, and the record show
that a defendant accused of crime is aware of the various rights he is giving up by entering a plea of guilty
to that charge. As the Court pointed out, when a trial
court fulfills this function, a record is left for any re,·icw that may later be sought. As the Court further
pointed out, 23 L.Ed.2d at 280, fn. 7, most "criminal
con\'ictions are obtained after a guilty plea. If these
convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial
court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant ... "
The rationale of Boykin is that a guilty plea is not
to be accepted unless it is intelligently, knowingly, and
\'oluntarily entered. As the Court said in Brady v.
United States,
Waivers of constitutional rights not only must
be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
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acts 1lone with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
25 L.Ed.2d at 756.
The basis of Boykin (which was not a new concept,
but just a new requirement that the "record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded
guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily," [See Brady v. United States, supra, 25 L.Ed.2d at
756, fo. 4 l) was that a defendant is not to plead guilty
except with a full understanding of the possible consequences of his plea. Brady v. United State.v, .mpra, 25
L.Ed.2d at 756, fn. 6.

Bo.1Jldn has not been altered. The Court in Brady v.
United States, supra, said that the voluntariness of
Bradv's plea must be determined by considering all the
relevant circumstances surrounding it. However, the
guilty plea in Brady was entered in 1959 and so the re·
quirement of Boykin (that the record show the voluntariness of the plea) was not applicable to Brady's plea.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that ap·
pellant was aware of the rights he was waiving. Noth·
ing indicates that elsewhere in the record was he so
advised. The court asked appellant if he had been in
the penitentary before and the District Attorney said
that he thought appellant understood the results of the
offense. \Vhen the court asked appellant if he wanted
to be heard, his counsel said no. This is clearly not in
accord with Boykin and is not any indication whatever
that appellant knew the results of his plea. Because the
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clear mandates of Boyldn were not followed appellant
contends that his confinement is illegal and void and
he must be granted the writ of habeas corpus he seeks.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMITTING APPELLANT'S PRIOR RECORD INTO
EYIDENCE.
At the hearing on appellant's Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, respondent offered into evidence
Exhibit 3, which purported to be a copy of appellant's
"rap sheet" or prior aJTest record. (R. 42) Appellant
objected to the introduction of such exhibit on the
grounds that it was hearsay and not relevant. (R. 42)
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63, defines
hearsay as
Evidence of a statement which is made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated ....
Exhibit 3 is clearly hearsay in that it was offered to
prove that the contents of the exhibit were appellant's
actual and true past record. Unless one of the exceptions
under Rule 63 is applicable, the exhibit was inadmissable. Appellant submits that none of the exceptions to
the hearsay rule are applicable to Exhibit 3. It is clear-

8

ly not a business entry under Rule G3 ( 13) as it was
not shown that it was made in the regular course of business and at the time of the act, and that the sources of
the information and the circumstances of the preparation indicated it's trustworthiness. It is not a report of a
public official of a state or the United States under
Rule G3 ( 15) and it is not an official record under Rule
63 (17).
E,·en if the exhibit objected to was within one of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule, the exhibit was not
properly identified in that no proper foundation was
laid. No evidence was set forth as to who prepared the
exhibit, there was no e\·idence of whose custody the docu·
ment came from, and no e\•idence was offered to show
how the document was prepared nor that it was in any
way trustworthy or accurate. See, generally, l\IcCormick
on Evidence (Hornbook Series, 1956) § 185, p. 395.
It was offered as being appe11ant's "rap sheet" and was
admitted over objection. In Clayton v. ftlctropulitan
Life Insurance Co., 96 Utah 331, 8i) P.2d 819 (1938},
this court affirmed the lower court's ruling as to the
admissability of certain documentary evidence. In that
case the plaintiff' obtained a judgment for damages
under a policy of insurance. The defendant's insurance
company contended that recovery was barred by the
terms of the policy because of the plaintiff's prior
health. To show plaintiff's prior health, the defendant
offered into evidence hospital records, accompanied by
the testimony of a doctor who brought to court those
hospital record sheets. The doctor did not know who
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nmde the hospital record sheets, he did not know who
hacl custody of them, and he could not account for the
compilation and preparation of some of the sheets so
as to guarantee their trustworthiness. This court discussed the "shop book" rule in that case, but concluded
from the above factors that no proper foundation had
been laid for the exhibits and upheld the trial court's
ruling of not admitting such evidence. 'Vhile it is not
clear that respondent offered Exhibit 8 in appellant's
case as falling within the old "shop book" rule [now the
business entry rule, U.R.E., Rule 68 (18) ], Clayton
seems to apply to any documentary evidence in that it
at least requires some showing that the document offered is trustworthy in some way by showing how it was
made, or by whom it was compiled, or at least who had
custody of the document. See generally, 'Vharton's
Criminal Evidence, § 575 (12th Ed. 1955).
As such as not done, appellant contends that the
court below erred in admitting into evidence Exhibit 8,
appellant's alleged "rap sheet." The admission of the
exhibit could have made appellant look like a man with
a vast criminal background and thus knowedgahle of
the criminal process, lending credence to Respondent's
position that appellant knowingly and intelligently entered his plea of guilty. Without a proper foundation
for the exhibit, there was no showing that the exhibit
represented accurately and reliably appellant's alleged
criminal background. Appellant thus contends that it
was error on the part of the court below to admit Exhibit 3, the error being such as to call for reversal of the
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<'ourt below. If this court finds that appellant's plea
was voluntarily entered appellant contends that the adof Exhibit 3 calls for a reversal and a remand
of the case for a further hearing without the admission
of Exhibit 3.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the record does
not show that appellant's guilty plea was knowingly
entered, and that the court below erred in admitting
certain evidence, appellant respectfully submits thnt
the judgment of the court below be reversed and that
he be released from custody of the Respondent on the
\Vrit of Habeas Corpus he seeks.
Respectfully submitted,
BRUCE C. LUBECK

Attarney for Appellant
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